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CASENOTES
ADVERTISERS BEWARE: BETTE MIDLER DOESN'T
WANT TO DANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Celebrity product endorsements have gained enormous economic
value in the modem commercial market.' Many celebrities cash-in on
their fame by appearing in advertisements endorsing products. For in-
stance, Michael Jackson received an estimated fifty million dollars for his
appearance in a series of Pepsi Cola commercials and allowed Pepsi to
sponsor the Jacksons' 1984 "Victory Tour."2
In contrast, other well-known celebrities disdain such commercial
exploitation thereby foregoing any income or public exposure product
endorsements generate. Bruce Springsteen, who consistently spurns en-
dorsement offers, allegedly refused Chrysler Motor Corporation's 1986
offer of twelve million dollars to perform a revised version of his hit song
"Born in the U.S.A." in a television commercial advertising Chrysler's
automobiles.3 Bette Midler, also known for her active stance against
commercial endorsements, refused a similar offer from Ford Motor Co.4
When such individuals attain fame and notoriety, the law protects
certain aspects of their talent from unauthorized appropriation in various
ways. For example, California recognizes the common law tort of misap-
propriation when a third party commercially exploits an attribute of a
celebrity's identity without consent. A recent example was Midler v.
Ford Motor Co., 5 where the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the
attributes of an individual's identity which are entitled to legal protec-
tion. The court held that under California law, singer/actress Bette Mid-
ler6 stated a tort claim based on Ford Motor Company's unauthorized
1. "Commercial market" is a term used to describe the use of advertising in various me-
dia forms to sell products.
2. McDougal, Michael Jackson In a Thriller of a Contract, L.A. Times, May 5, 1986,
Part VI (Calendar) at 1.
3. Horovitz, Reebok Walks Marketing Tightrope With Human Rights Concert Tour, L.A.
Times, July 26, 1988, Part IV (Business) at 6.
4. Schmitt, Singers Get Green Light to Sue Imitators" Court Rules Sound-Alike Ad May
Be Theft, Wall St. J., August 19, 1988, § 2 at 19.
5. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
6. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.
1988). Bette Midler is a well-known recording artist, concert performer, author, comedienne
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use of a voice which sounded like Midler's in one of its commercials.7
A. Statement of the Case
In 1985, Ford and its advertising agency, Young and Rubicam, Inc.
("Young"), created a television commercial campaign targeting the
"Yuppie" 8 car buyer. They used popular songs from the 1970s, reminis-
cent of the Yuppie generation's college years. In their efforts to use the
original singers in the commercials, Young contacted Midler's manager,
Gerald Edelstein, to inquire whether Midler would sing her hit version of
"Do You Want To Dance?" in a commercial advertising Ford's Mercury
Sable.9 The request was flatly refused.'
Based on this refusal, Young contacted Ula Hedwig ("Hedwig"), a
former member of Midler's backup group, the "Harlettes." Hedwig was
hired and instructed to imitate Midler's singing style and "to sound as
much as possible like the Midler record."" Once the commercial aired,
friends told both Hedwig and Midler that they believed Midler had per-
formed in the commercial. Others in the entertainment industry thought
so as well, despite the fact that neither Midler's name, picture nor en-
dorsement were used. 2 Although Young obtained a license from the
song's copyright owner for the use of the song, Young did not ask Midler
or Edelstein for permission to imitate Midler's vocal style or voice.' 3
Midler sued Ford and Young for the misappropriation of her voice
by imitation without consent after the commercial aired. The district
court in Los Angeles granted Ford's motion for summary judgment
holding that Midler failed to state a claim.' 4 Although the district court
found the defendant's conduct comparable to that of an "average thief,"
the court found no basis to prevent the imitation of Midler's voice or
grant compensation for its use. 
5
The court of appeals reversed the district court's ruling and held
that Midler had made a sufficient showing to defeat summary judg-
and motion picture actress. She has recorded more than ten albums, sold millions of records
and received platinum and gold record awards. In addition, Midler received two Grammys, a
Tony and was nominated for an Academy Award for her role in the motion picture The Rose.
7. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
8. "Yuppie" is a term describing young urban professionals.
9. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 462.
13. Id.
14. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
15. Id.
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ment.' 6 The court concluded that Midler had a tort claim under Califor-
nia law for Ford's commercial misappropriation of Midler's voice and
remanded the case for trial.17
B. Reasoning of the Court
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals set out guidelines for the trial
court by discussing the possible remedies available to Midler at law.
First, the court dismissed Ford's argument that the first amendment' 8
protected Ford's use of "Midler's" voice. The court reasoned that Ford's
use of Midler's voice was for mere exploitation and in the absence of any
"informative or cultural" purpose, the first amendment immunity will
not protect Ford's use of Midler's identity.19
Second, the court found that Midler's claim was not preempted by
federal copyright law as Ford and Young argued. Ford defended its ac-
tions by emphasizing that its use of a copyrighted work to which it held a
license permitted commercial use of the song in this manner. However,
the court reasoned that since Midler was not claiming a protected inter-
est in her rendition of the song nor trying to enjoin Ford's use of the
copyrighted song itself, her suit was not based on copyright.2" Rather,
Midler was contesting the use of an imitation of her voice and her singing
style which was not preempted by federal copyright law.2
The Midler court distinguished the case of Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire
and Rubber Co., 22 on the above grounds. Nancy Sinatra claimed that
because she had popularized a rendition of the song, "These Boots Are
Made For Walkin',"23 it became identified with her name and was there-
fore protected under copyright law, even though she did not own a li-
cense or any other right to use the song. The Ninth Circuit rejected
Sinatra's argument, stating that finding a protected interest under the
Copyright Act in that case would contravene the policy which encour-
ages and protects original works of authorship.24
16. Id. at 463.
17. Id. at 463-64.
18. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 906 (1971).
23. Criterion Music is the copyright owner of this popular tune from the late 1960s.
24. Midler, 849 F.2d 460, 462 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988)).
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The court discussed another method to challenge an imitation of
one's voice and cited Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.25 as an example. In
Lahr, Bert Lahr, an actor famous for his portrayal of the cowardly lion
in The Wizard of Oz, 26 successfully challenged the use of an imitation of
his voice in conjunction with a duck cartoon in a television commercial.
Lahr claimed that the unauthorized imitation of his "style of vocal deliv-
ery [which] was distinctive in pitch, accent, inflection and sounds"27 con-
stituted unfair competition because the "defendant's conduct saturated
the plaintiff's audience, curtailing his market."28
The Midler court recognized the similarity of the Lahr facts to the
facts before it, but distinguished Lahr. Although both plaintiffs chal-
lenged the use of imitations of their voices, Lahr's claim was based on
unfair competition, whereas Midler was precluded from such recovery
because she was not in the commercial market.29 The Midler court
found that Ford's "one minute commercials"3 would not "steal [her]
thunder"'" as in Lahr.
The court also held that California Civil Code section 3344 was in-
applicable to Midler's claim.32 The court found that although the statute
provides a remedy when a person's name, voice or likeness is used,
neither Midler's name, likeness, nor voice, as defined by the statute, were
used by Ford. The court explained that "likeness" refers to a "visual
image not a vocal imitation."33 The court found that Midler's voice must
have been used by Ford to allow recovery under the statute.34 However,
the court found that the statute did not bar Midler from use of the com-
mon law tort of misappropriation since the "statute itself implies that
such common law causes of action do exist because it says its remedies
25. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462 (citing Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st
Cir. 1962)).
26. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1939.
27. Midler, 849 F.2d at 462.
28. Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co., 300 F.2d 256, 259 (1st Cir. 1962).
29. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
30. Id. at 462.
31. Lahr, 300 F.2d at 259.
32. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. Section 3344 of the Cal. Civil Code provides in pertinent
part:
Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods or services...
without such person's prior consent.., shall be liable for any damages ....
(g) The remedies provided for in this section are cumulative and shall be in addi-
tion to any others provided for by law.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (1988).
33. Midler, 849 F.2d 460, 463.
34. Id.
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are merely cumulative."3
The court explained that California courts have recognized that an
individual has a proprietary interest in his identity which is protected
under the common law tort of misappropriation. For example, in Mot-
schenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, Co.,36 Reynolds, a cigarette man-
ufacturer, used a photograph of Lothar Motschenbacher, a famous
racecar driver, and his racecar in a nationally televised commercial en-
doming their product, Winston cigarettes, without his permission.37
Although Motschenbacher was driving the car depicted, he was not
visible in the photograph. Reynolds altered the photograph by changing
the car's number from "ll" to "71" and added a "spoiler" 3 with the
Winston insignia.39 However, the court found that Reynolds did not
change the distinctive color, pinstriping and oval medallion representing
the "sign and symbols" by which Motschenbacher and his cars are
known.' The court concluded that those viewing the commercial be-
lieved Motschenbacher was in fact endorsing Winston cigarettes, by the
use of "uniquely distinctive features"41 identified with Motschenbacher.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant had invaded a "pro-
prietary interest" of Motschenbacher in his own identity protected under
California law.42
The Midler court found its case distinguishable from Mot-
schenbacher, because unlike Midler's persona and voice, Motschenbacher
and his vehicle were actually used in the commercial, and Mot-
schenbacher derived a significant part of his income from such product
endorsements whereas Midler did not. As a result, the court found it
irrelevant that Motschenbacher could not be seen. By using the "signs"
and "symbols" associated with Motschenbacher, the defendants had ap-
propriated his identity as an endorser.43
The Midler court analogized Ford's use of an imitation of Midler's
voice to the Motschenbacher facts. The court found Midler's distinctive
vocal style to be the symbols and signs associated with her. Therefore,
the use of an imitation of Midler's voice was as if she endorsed Ford's
product, even though Ford used an imitation. The court emphasized
35. Id.
36. 498 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir. 1974).
37. Id. at 822.
38. Id.
39. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
40. Id
41. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 822.
42. Id. at 825.
43. Id.
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that Midler's voice was the attribute that Ford sought to use in endorsing
their product. Furthermore, the court recognized that the value of Mid-
ler's voice to the advertisement was such that Ford engaged a sound-
alike, Hedwig, to make the endorsement when Midler refused to do so."
The court found that Midler and Ford both recognized the commer-
cial value of using Midler's distinctive voice in the Ford commercials.45
For this reason, the court concluded that Midler, as a well-known and
distinctive "chanteuse," 46 had acquired a proprietary interest in her voice
and "to impersonate her voice is to pirate her identity."47 The commer-
cial value "was what the market would have paid for Midler to have sung
the commercial in person. '48
The court emphasized that "[a] voice is as distinctive and personal
as a face. The human voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is
manifested."49 Although the court remanded the case for trial, it limited
such protections to "distinctive" and "well-known" voices which are de-
liberately imitated for commercial exploitation."
II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Right of Privacy and Appropriation
The doctrine of appropriation is one of the four categories of the
common law right of privacy.51 In 1960, Dean William Prosser52 suc-
cinctly described the four recognized categories constituting the right of
privacy. The categories are: 1) the right against intrusion into personal
areas; 2) public disclosure of private facts; 3) false light in the public eye;
and 4) appropriation: the "exploitation of the attributes of the plaintiff's
identity."53
However, many courts and commentators have distinguished appro-
priation from the other three categories of the right to privacy. 4 Appro-
priation not only focuses on the protection of one's identity from
commercial exploitation, but also one's privacy in his identity, rather
44. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
45. Id.
46. Id. Chanteuse is another term for a woman singer.
47. Midler, 849 F.2d 460, 463.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. W. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 401 (1960).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
[Vol. 9
APPROPRIATION
than from public humiliation or embarrassment." California courts
have used the appropriation doctrine to prevent third parties from profit-
ing from the misuse of a plaintiff's identity.
56
B. Right of Publicity
Although courts have used the doctrine of appropriation to protect
the same rights or similar rights afforded by the right of publicity, the
two actions are distinct. The right of publicity, although similar to the
appropriation doctrine, is narrower in scope and application. 57 For ex-
ample, the right of publicity is generally applicable to celebrities or those
individuals who have acquired commercial value in their name and im-
age, and protects them from unauthorized exploitation. 8 Another dis-
tinction is that the tort of misappropriation protects a person's dignity
and the unpermitted use of his identity from exploitation. By contrast,
the right of publicity protects an individual's proprietary interest and in-
sures that he may control and benefit from the exploitation. Although
these distinctions are recognized, the two rights are often mistakenly
interchanged.59
Under either the right of publicity or appropriation, a plaintiff must
be able to prove both identifiability and that the defendant used the ap-
propriated "thing" for his pecuniary advantage.' The right of publicity
additionally requires the plaintiff with a proprietary interest to show that
the personal attribute is identifiable with that celebrity, and it must be a
creation of the celebrity's labors, skills or talents.6 '
III. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINION
A. Appropriation Claim
The Midler court's decision extends the scope of the appropriation
doctrine to allow recovery for the misappropriation of attributes of an
individual's identity such as one's voice. However, the holding is limited
to distinctive voices which are so identifiable and widely known that the
individual can be recognized without being present.62 Generally, the
55. Id.
56. R. Hoffman, The Right of Publicity An Analytical Update, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. REV.
1, 11 (1982).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Hoffman, supra note 56, at 11.
62. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
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right of recovery is equated with celebrity status although the degree of
identifiability may be difficult to measure. The court's ability to identify
the imitated party is essential to prove the claim, yet the unauthorized
exploitation of his identity is the tort.63
The Motschenbacher court's use of the privacy-based right against
commercial appropriation exemplified the tort's flexibility and broad ap-
plication in protecting intangible attributes such as signs and symbols of
an individual's persona or uniqueness. 6" However, the Motschenbacher
court refused to specify whether its ruling was based on the common law
doctrine of appropriation or the right of publicity, both of which are rec-
ognized in California.65
The Motschenbacher court's rationale was based on this quote from
Prosser who synthesizes the two approaches:
Although the element of protection of the plaintiff's personal
feelings is obviously not to be ignored in such a case, the effect
of the appropriation decisions is to recognize or create an exclu-
sive right in the individual plaintiff to a species of trade name,
his own, and a kind of trade mark in his likeness. It seems
quite pointless to dispute over whether such a right is to be
classified as 'property'; it is at least clearly proprietary in its
nature. Once protected by the law, it is a right of value upon
which the plaintiff can capitalize by selling licenses.66
Applying the Motschenbacher analysis to Midler, Midler would have
a common law right in the attributes of her voice and vocal style which is
equal to a "trademark"67 in her likeness. The court found that the value
of Midler's trademark to Ford was obvious by the great lengths Ford
exercised to find an imitator to create the impression that Midler in fact
was singing in Ford's commercial. In other words, if Midler's voice had
no commercial value to Ford, then it would not have gone to the trouble
and expense of imitating it when Midler refused to sing in its commer-
cial. Ford set the stage to misappropriate Midler's trademark at great
cost to Midler.68
In this case, Ford acted as other commercial advertisers who com-
monly buy a license to use a popular song and hire less expensive imita-
tors or studio musicians to duplicate popular renditions. The practice
63. Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 826.
66. Id. at 825.
67. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827.
68. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988).
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has long been defended and upheld under copyright law which allows
duplication of live performances.69 If Ford had not acted in such an
overzealous and deliberate manner in acquiring a Midler imitation, the
court may not have looked beyond copyright law to grant relief.
B. Right of Publicity Claim
Even under the narrower right of publicity, Midler has a claim. For
example, in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,7° the Sixth
Circuit protected Johnny Carson's right of publicity in the phrase
"Here's Johnny" 7' and its use by the defendant in the naming of its prod-
uct."2 In Carson, the court concluded that the corporation intentionally
used the phrase "Here's Johnny" in its corporate name and in naming
and endorsing its product, a portable toilet. Furthermore, the defendant
described its product as the "World's Foremost Commodian" to associ-
ate with Johnny Carson's fame.
The Sixth Circuit stated that Prosser's fourth category of right to
privacy, or appropriation, was in fact the modem right of publicity. The
Carson court relied on Motschenbacher in coming to its conclusion and
held that "if the celebrity's identity is commercially exploited, there has
been an invasion of his right whether or not his likeness is used. Carson's
identity may be exploited even if his name, John W. Carson or his picture
is not used."73
In contrast, the dissent in Carson argued that the common law right
of publicity should not and does not include "phrases or other things
merely associated with the individual as the phrase, 'Here's Johnny'""
as in the tort of appropriation. If expanded under the right of publicity,
the effect would be to remove these phrases from the 'public domain'
contravening both first amendment rights and copyright law.75
The dissent reasoned that the policy behind the right of publicity is
not effectuated by the majority's broad application of the right of public-
ity in the Carson case. The "strong federal policy permits the free use of
intellectual property, words and ideas that are in general circulation and
not protected by a valid copyright patent or trademark. ' 76 The dissent
69. Wall St. J., August 19, 1988, § 2 at 19.
70. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
71. Id. at 832. The phrase "Here's Johnny" has been used to introduce Johnny Carson, a
well-known commedian, since his first television show in 1957.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 835.
74. Id. at 837.
75. Carson, 698 F.2d at 841.
76. Id.
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explained that the policy considerations of the right to publicity are to:
1) protect the celebrity's economic interest in his fame and identity; 2)
promote intellectual and creative works by protecting financial incen-
tives; 3) prevent unjust enrichment by those not producing the property
interest and 4) protect the public from unfair trade practices.77
The above policy considerations are supported by the Midler court's
decision and should be applied by the trial court as guidelines for its
decision on remand, because the court need not apply the doctrine so
broadly. As the dissent in Carson points out, an "individual's name, like-
ness, achievements, identifying characteristics or actual performances" '
are protected by the right of publicity. Therefore, the facts in Midler
illustrate that Midler's property interest in her voice and vocal style, as
an "identifying characteristic, '79 should be protected under either the
right of publicity or the appropriation doctrine.
The Midler court's analysis suggested that California Civil Code sec-
tion 3344 swallowed up the common law right of publicity.8 ° However,
the court pointed out that section 3344 is cumulative and therefore sup-
plements rather than subverts common law rights such as right of public-
ity and appropriation. In effect, the Midler court treated appropriation
and right of publicity as a single tort remedy.
C. An Additional Claim Under the Federal Lanham Trademark Act
An additional remedy available to Midler which was not analyzed
by the court is the protection provided by the federal Lanham Trade-
mark Act, (the "Act")8' which prohibits the false descriptions of prod-
ucts or their origins. For example, in Allen v. National Video, Inc.,82 a
video company used a Woody Allen look-alike in a national advertising
campaign. The district court held that the impersonator created a likeli-
hood of consumer confusion over the celebrity endorsement which vio-
lated the Act. 3
The Allen court explained that to fall within the protection of the
Act, a plaintiff must show an "involvement of goods or services .... effect
on interstate commerce, and . false designation of origin or false de-
77. Id. at 838.
78. Id. at 837.
79. Id.
80. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988).
82. 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
83. Id. at 632.
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scription of the goods or services."84 The Allen court broadly construed
the Act and reasoned that the Act had been applied to instances of unfair
competition outside the traditional parameters of trademark infringe-
ment.8 The purpose behind the Act was to protect the public from
harmful deception through reliance on a celebrity's identity in his or her
endorsement of a product.8 6
The Allen court recognized the value of Allen's reputation as an
internationally recognized director and actor serving as his protectible
mark. The court found that Allen's fame and notoriety, based on his
"reputation for artistic integrity, have significant, exploitable, commer-
cial value."' 87 The framers of the Act recognized the "psychological
value of symbols"'88 and their tendency to deceive the public.
In finding in favor of Woody Allen, the court held that the potential
rather than actual consumer deception caused by the endorsement was
the key factor. In addition, the Act does not require Allen, who is not in
the commercial market, to be in competition with the defendant in order
to receive protection under the Act.89
The court explained that Boroff, the impersonator, could continue
his services as a look-alike in "any setting where the overall context
makes it completely clear that he is a look-alike and that plaintiff has
nothing to do with the project .... ,0 The Allen court required "bold
and unequivocal disclaimer[s]."'" In addition, the court required that
the setting or context of the designation should have little or no
probability of creating public confusion.92
The Midler facts support the use of the Lanham Act as an addi-
tional claim available to protect Midler's interests.93 Federal law is ap-
plicable to Midler's claim because Ford's product was distributed
nationally, the advertising campaign was national and the goods were
within the stream of interstate commerce.94 Midler has standing to sue
because, similar to Allen, Midler's mark is her unique voice and vocal
84. Id. at 625.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 617.
88. Id. at 625.
89. Id. at 620.
90. Id. at 630.
91. Id.
92. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 630.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1988). The court denied the plaintiff's motion to amend her com-
plaint to include a Lanham Act claim.
94. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 461 (9th Cir. 1988).
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qualities which are nationally recognized in her profession as a singer,
actress and comedienne.95
The Lanham Act claim does not require that Midler be in competi-
tion with Ford or that she had previously exploited her identity commer-
cially. The Midler court found that the value of Midler's voice as an
endorsement for Ford was significant and that the deceptive nature of the
Ford campaign created a false impression that Midler endorsed Ford's
product.96 The court found that the value of Midler's voice and talents
are internationally recognized, and Ford's exploitation of those attributes
by imitation created consumer deception, which appear to be in direct
violation of the letter and intent of the Lanham Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The effect of the Midler ruling on advertisers, imitators and sound-
alikes will be minimal if proper steps are taken to identify the performing
artist apart from the celebrity impersonated. The Midler case prevents
the unauthorized use of a celebrity's identifiable attribute such as a voice
or vocal style made without identification of the imitated celebrity. Iden-
tifying the impersonation alleviates liability and reduces the public de-
ception when a celebrity's identity is imitated by another. An
impersonator or celebrity look-alike who does not identify himself apart
from the celebrity or the celebrity's well-known vocal act can, in fact, be
enjoined under the right of publicity. 97
The court's application of the appropriation doctrine and the ruling
in favor of Midler appears reasonable because her voice is distinguishable
and recognizable to world-wide audiences. 98 In addition, Ford's appro-
priation of Midler's stylistic vocal characteristics by imitation are tanta-
mount to thievery. The Midler ruling attempts to address the
circumstance where a "sound-alike" purports to be the celebrity imitated
which results in an appropriation of the celebrity's identity. The court
attempts to limit its ruling to distinguishable voices. Inherent in such a
ruling is the extreme difficulty of applying the rule and in its enforcement
where the voice of the plaintiff is not as distinctive as Midler's. The court
did not explain how distinguishable or well-known the voice must be to
be deemed identifiable.
Remember, a state cause of action for misappropriation may be pre-
95. Id.
96. Id. at 462.
97. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1361 (D.N.J. 1981).
98. Midler, 849 F.2d at 461.
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empted by federal copyright law in circumstances where the imitation is
challenged on the basis of the copyrighted work and not primarily on the
misappropriation of the artist's voice. As a result, the chance of an over-
broad application of the appropriation doctrine is decreased while pre-
serving the intent and protection of original works of authorship under
copyright law.99
Terri Eileen Hilliard
99. Motown Record Corp. v. Hormel & Co., 657 F. Supp. 1236 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
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